000 04576cam a2200445 i 4500
001 17102974
005 20260107145214.0
008 120103s2012 enk 000 0 eng
010 _a 2012000086
020 _a9780521764490
_qHardback
020 _a9780521176040
_qPaperback
035 _a17102974
040 _aDLC
_beng
_cCUoM
_erda
_dDLC
041 1 _aeng
_hheb
042 _apcc
050 0 0 _aHB144
_b.H45513 2012
082 0 0 _a330.015193 HEI
_223
084 _aBUS044000
_2bisacsh
100 1 _aHeifetz, Aviad,
_d1965-
240 1 0 _aḤashivah asṭraṭegit.
_lEnglish
245 1 0 _aGame theory :
_binteractive strategies in economics and management /
_cAviad Heifetz.
264 1 _aCambridge :
_bCambridge University Press,
_c2012.
300 _axi, 448 pages ;
_c26 cm
336 _atext
_2rdacontent
337 _aunmediated
_2rdamedia
338 _avolume
_2rdacarrier
500 _a"First published in Hebrew by Open University of Israel Press 2008"--Verso of title page.
500 _aTranslation of the author's Ḥashivah asṭraṭegit.
505 8 _aMachine generated contents note: Part I. Strategic Interactions as Games: 1. Strategic form games; 2. Representing strategic interactions with games; Part II. Basic Solution Concepts for Strategic-Form Games: 3. Dominant strategies; 4. Strongly dominated strategies; 5. Weakly dominated strategies; 6. Nash equilibrium; Part III. Prominent Classes of Strategic-Form Games: 7. Cooperation or conflict, strategic complements or substitutes; 8. Concentrated markets; 9. Coordination games and strategic uncertainty; Part IV. Uncertainty and Mixed Strategies: 10. Choice under uncertainty and risk dominance; 11. Mixed strategies; 12. Security strategies, strictly competitive games and the minimax theorum; 13. Mixed strategies in general games; Part V: 14. Rationalize strategies; 15. Stability of equilibria; 16. Games and evolution; 17. Global games; Part VI: 18. Extensive-form games; 19. Non-credible threats, subgame perfect equilibrium and backward induction; 20. Commitment; 21. Backward induction - limitations and difficulties; 22. Moves of nature; Part VII: 23. Repeated games: the repeated prisoner's dilemma; 24. Games with unbounded horizon: additional models and results.
520 _a"Game theory is concerned with strategic interaction among several decision-makers. In such strategic encounters, all players are aware of the fact that their actions affect the other players. Game theory analyzes how these strategic, interactive considerations may affect the players' decisions and influence the final outcome. This textbook focuses on applications of complete-information games in economics and management, as well as in other fields such as political science, law and biology. It guides students through the fundamentals of game theory by letting examples lead the way to the concepts needed to solve them. It provides opportunities for self-study and self-testing through an extensive pedagogical apparatus of examples, questions and answers. The book also includes more advanced material suitable as a basis for seminar papers or elective topics, including rationalizability, stability of equilibria (with discrete-time dynamics), games and evolution, equilibrium selection and global games"--
_cProvided by publisher.
520 _a"Social interaction is essential to human life. How do people choose what to do when they encounter one another? And how do organizations, firms or countries interact? Game Theory is a modeling tool designed to represent and analyze such strategic interaction. The first part of this book is devoted to introducing the basic building blocks of game theory. The parties to the interaction are called players, the courses of actions available to them are their strategies, and the payoffs of each player from the various profiles of strategies (of all players) represent the way each player ranks the possible outcomes of the interaction from her own individual point of view"--
_cProvided by publisher.
650 0 _aGame theory.
650 0 _aEconomics.
650 0 _aManagement.
650 7 _aBUSINESS & ECONOMICS / Economics / Microeconomics.
_2bisacsh
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